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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research is to study Brazil’s current pacification efforts in the
favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Brazil has long been linked to violent crime, corruption, and
increasing social inequality. It features more homicides than any other country on earth:
one in ten people killed around the world each year is a Brazilian (Carvalho, 2015).
However, in 2008, Rio’s state government began applying a new law enforcement
program to rid favelas of gangs and crime before hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup and
2016 Summer Olympics. Information on the current/future tactics and strategies that Rio
will incorporate into its security program are based on interviews conducted with various
members of Brazilian law enforcement. By examining existing empirical studies, this
study focuses on whether Rio’s security efforts will ultimately be successful in fulfilling
the goal of making peace in the favelas and reducing drug trafficking and violence. The
results of this study show that Rio’s pacification program will not likely be a solution for
long-term stability in the region unless security personnel can incorporate real
community policing with favela residents and establish social programs for favela youth.

vi

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Over the past 30 years, since the democratization of Brazil, issues of violent crime
and the expansion of regional drug trading in the favelas (slums) of Brazil have become
more and more prominent. In fact, just within the past few years concern has risen
drastically due to the upcoming 2016 Olympic Games and the 2014 FIFA World Cup that
was hosted in states throughout Brazil this past summer. Immediately after winning both
bids to host the two mega-events, international spotlight was suddenly thrust upon Brazil
and it was obvious that something had to be done about its notorious crime-ridden slums.
The state of Rio de Janeiro in particular, which is where the 2016 Olympic games will
take place, has always been seen by news media as one of the “leaders” when it comes to
the nation’s rising poverty and crime rates.
According to a Brazil 2014 Crime and Security Report, violent crimes such as
murder, rape, kidnapping, carjacking, armed assault, and burglary, occur regularly
(OSAC, 2014). However, it is not just citizens that have a bad reputation; there are many
cases of police misconduct and corruption as well. A long history of extrajudicial
killings and excessive violence by police officers has tainted people’s view of law
enforcement in major cities throughout Brazil. Mistrust of police officers is common
among both the rich and poor of Brazil, hindering recent efforts for winning support on
new security plans implemented by Rio’s State government.
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Even though Brazil’s economy has been on the rise for many years, now with the
seventh largest economy in the world; it still has third-world problems. For example,
anyone who paid the slightest attention to Brazil or the World Cup in 2014 was probably
aware of the mass protests throughout the country that have saturated news stations the
past two years leading up to the World Cup (Kadiyala, 2015). These protests were
mainly caused by citizens’ frustration and dissatisfaction with their government’s
excessive spending on getting ready for the World Cup instead of using funds to better
education, public health, and transportation. Yet, long before international exposure was
brought forth this way, Brazil has always been known as a country rife with political and
social controversies. In the midst of this, one might ask the obvious question of what, if
anything, has been done to snuff out these problems?
Thankfully, a plan has been put into place that claims to target and combat these
issues; yet there is much debate on whether the strategies implemented by the Brazilian
government have actually done more harm than good. The main program currently in
use, and the subject area of this thesis, is the implementation of Unidade de Polícia
Pacificadora (UPPs) in Rio’s favelas (UPP, n.d.). The main aim of these pacifying police
units is to reclaim favelas previously controlled by gangs or drug dealers. There are of
course certain steps UPPs go through before a favela can officially be labeled “pacified”,
but these steps will be further discussed in chapter two’s review of literature.

Statement of Problem
Figuring out ways for law enforcement and security personnel to manage crime in
just a normal, everyday setting is already a tough job; but police forces in Brazil face

2

many more challenges than what one would usually face in the United States, with the
exception of certain well-known crime spots. However, since Brazil’s history is very
much dominated by militarism, covering public safety remains an extremely difficult
problem for law enforcement agents. The vast amount of opposition shown from favela
residents and nonresidents alike these past few years has finally dwindled down in
numbers recently. But there is definitely still a big percentage of citizens and even some
government officials who think the UPP program is either a waste of time or just simply a
show caused by international spotlight (Daily Mail Reporter, 2013). This begs the
question as to whether UPP’s tactics in recovering Rio’s favelas are truly working and
whether they will work in the future, and during my time abroad in Brazil, those are the
exact questions I covered in this thesis.

Purpose of Study
The purpose of this research is to study Brazil’s current pacification efforts in the
favelas of Rio de Janeiro. By examining existing empirical studies, this study focuses on
whether Rio’s security efforts will ultimately be successful in fulfilling the goal of
making peace in the favelas and reducing drug trafficking and violence. In addition,
while spending six months in Rio de Janeiro, I visited pacified favelas and interviewed
several high-ranking security officials about their agencies’ current and future plans for
pacification. The four most important questions are outlined below:
1. What are the tactics that UPP and BOPE (Special Police Operations Battalion) use
to reduce drug trafficking & stabilize favelas?
2. How successful have they been?
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3. What new/future tactics do they intend to use?
4. Based on existing empirical studies, what is the likelihood that these new tactics
will be successful?
I addressed the research questions through qualitative data obtained through
interviews in Rio de Janeiro, analysis performed on existing empirical studies, and
my own experiences in Brazil. For the future safety of both international tourists and
natives alike, it is important to analyze Rio’s security programs and research the best
methods to prevent and deal with areas of high crime.

Limitations and Gaps in Knowledge
Because the subject of the favelas is so sensitive in touching on the
profound class and racial divisions of Brazil, certain limitations emerged. In the first
place, security individuals interviewed during this study may hold a bias toward Rio’s
pacification program; this makes it difficult to ascertain how much truth was told in
interviews versus false information given in order to make the program look good.
On the other hand, those who criticized the program may be biased against police and
law enforcement in general.
Since Brazil’s government is not as transparent or forthcoming as other
countries, it was hard to obtain accurate statistics and data with regard to reductions
or increases in crime. Also, there is an assumption made that all law enforcement
personnel will answer interview questions truthfully and to the best of their
knowledge. Any conclusions or recommendations given by the researcher in this
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thesis should be taken with caution in the effect that information obtained from
security personnel was not given honestly.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
If one were to go back and research the vast history of Brazil’s favelas and
security/political governance, they would find a fascinating history that is unique to this
area and its people. There is an exclusively rich historical and cultural aspect of these
favelas that most outside societies do not hear very often, and this clearly justifies a more
detailed analysis to better comprehend this chapter’s concentration on the history, crime,
and problems that modern favelas continue to face and the type of violence they typically
breed. In addition to favela history, this chapter addresses the most relevant information
other researchers and scholars have found on the subject of preventing crime; specifically
on what they think works, what has proved not to work, and what has the most potential
to work. I will also attempt to relay as much information as possible about what the
government of Brazil has done to fix these problems as well as determining the success
of past and current strategies.
Starting with Rio de Janeiro’s favela history, it is first necessary to understand
what a favela is. Most websites gave a very simple, short definition. I realized that
throughout Latin America in general, the word favela was used interchangeably with
“ghetto,” “shantytown,” or “slum” (all of which have historically negative connotations).
However, during my time in Brazil I discovered that the actual residents of these “slums”
did not use the word favela to the great extent that outsiders do. Instead, they prefer to
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call their place of residency a “community” or comunidade. Interestingly enough, it is
indeed very similar to what most people would consider a community throughout
America as well as other regions of the world. Even though favelas have bad reputations
of being poor, unsanitary, and violent places to live and visit, the characteristics of the
average favela resemble that of a “normal” community. In fact, most favelas have their
own unique communities with food and clothes shops, pharmacies, repair shops and even
small businesses. The range normally depends on the size of the population and location
of the favela since not every favela is the same.
However, since there is still a bad connotation associated with the word “favela”,
for the purpose of this thesis I have chosen to use the word ‘community’ interchangeably
with favela so readers are able to see the two descriptions as one meaning. Although
favela is the most popular and common word when describing these residencies, its
meaning has a tendency to unconsciously cause people to form a biased opinion of the
topic. I have discussed this subject at length with several Brazilian security officials and
each one chose to use ‘comunidade’ in place of favela, even correcting me when I
introduced my initial interview questions using the term “favela.”
Further, the switch to the usage of comunidade may offer a clear sign that the
residents, outside population, and most importantly the government, are attempting to
establish a sense of belonging and inclusion for the inhabitants that, until recently, has
never been taken seriously. From the start of the very first favela in the late 1890’s, these
informal communities were always seen as something the Brazilian government was
ashamed of. In a statement made by Redes1 director Eliana Silva, government officials
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A civil society organization that promotes sustainable development in favela communities
throughout Brazil.
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“have traditionally considered the dwellings eyesores and literally left them off the map”
(Reporter, 2013). Yet Brazil is not the only with this attitude. Many developing
countries face similar problems due to the huge issue of urban poverty, especially
unemployment, low incomes and a lack of access to basic urban services in their own
slums. Governments do not want to acknowledge these problems, which has
unfortunately resulted in the increase of slum dwellers. According to a 2003 global
assessment of slums by the United Nations, almost 1 billion people, or 32 per cent of the
world’s urban population, live in slums, and this number is projected to rise up to 2
billion by year 2030 if nothing is done to address the problem (UN-HABITAT, 2003).

Brief History of Favela Settlements
In general, the majority of slums represent the worst of urban poverty and
inequality. In Brazil’s case, the birth of the first favelas developed into the perfect
example to showcase how social inequality was, and still is, produced in Brazil. Data
from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) showed that in 2010, six
percent of the Brazilian population lived in slums. This means that out of 190 million
people, 11.4 million lived in areas of irregular occupation with a lack of public services
and urbanization (IBGE, 2012).
Speaking to its origin, most scholars agree that the first real “favela” community
was constructed on what is known as the Morro da Providencia (Providencia Hill) by
homeless veteran soldiers returning from the Canudos War - a military campaign in the
north-eastern region of Brazil- around 1897. Despite promises by the government, the
state had failed to compensate the soldiers for their time spent serving their country, so
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their presence on the Morro da Providencia essentially served as a form of protest to the
state’s failed obligations (Arias, 2006). Interestingly enough, the soldiers who fought in
the Canudos War had found a plant in the interior region of Bahia called a “favela”hence the naming of their first favela community (Arias, 2006).
At the turn of the 20th century, there were several issues that contributed to the
configuration of Rio’s first form of popular housing commonly known as “squatter
settlements.” One of the first contributions happened in 1888 with the abolition of
slavery. This resulted in a large number of unemployed and homeless people who had
nowhere to go and no place that would give them work. Slavery in Brazil, even more so
than in the United States and other countries, had created an immense lower class and
extreme inequalities (Brazil Abolishes Slavery, 1999). Freed slaves began flocking to
Brazil’s then-capital of Rio de Janeiro, where it remained the national capital until 1960,
in the hopes of beginning a new life and finding work. Yet, they were not the only ones in
search for a better life. Due to a “crisis” in the rural areas, migration from the country to
the city increased significantly due to reductions in agricultural work and a boost in
industrialization (Magalhaes & Xavier, 2003). Finally, one of the last urban changes to
affect the first squatter settlements was the removal of many low-income populations and
the demolishment of their houses by the consent of former Mayor Pereira Passos (Zarzar,
2008).
Serious problems of homelessness continued to grow in the city of Rio de Janeiro
during the early 1900’s. This problem, coupled with precarious transportation from roads
being destroyed under the Mayor’s urban reform, resulted in the lower-class workforce
remaining close to their workplace near the squatter settlements (Ferreira, 2009).
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Interestingly, these settlements began to rise up right beside the richest neighborhoods in
Rio. There were literally hundreds of favelas popping up next door to expensive
penthouses and Rio’s most famous beaches (Perlman, 2009). If you were lucky enough
to be invited to the balcony of one of these extravagant penthouses, especially in presentday, you would have the opportunity of viewing the favelas in almost every direction.
During the Vargas2 administration, these low-income communities shot up
significantly from the 1930s onward. This is mostly attributed to migration generated by
industrialization in major Southeast cities, Rio being one of them (Arias, 2006). In fact,
migration reached its highest rate in the 20th century with “38 per cent of inhabitants
originating from outside the city” (Magalhaes, 2003). In addition, from 1950 to 1980, the
number of people living in favelas in Rio de Janeiro alone increased from about 170,000
to more than 600,000, and by the early 21st century it was estimated that there were as
many as 1,000 favelas (Wallenfeldt, 2013).
Yet despite the drastic increase of favelas, or maybe because of them, there were
many plans by politicians and government targeting the removal of these communities
based on their claim that favelas were “illegal” settlements (Perlman, 2009). Because of
this mentality the favelas were seen as places undeserving of services such as electricity
and running water. In accordance with this idea, Brazil’s poor essentially viewed
themselves as illegal immigrants in their own land; often outside the boundaries and
protections of the law. By 1960, 80 percent of favela households had access to
electricity; however, this is mainly attributed to the use of illegal, pirated connections and
favors granted from corrupt politicians in exchange for votes (Fischer, 2008). Instead of

2

Getúlio Vargas was president of Brazil from 1930-45 and 1951-54.
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providing better social housing, the government instilled “slum clearances” in which
thousands of residents were evicted from their homes. These operations were especially
popular during the military dictatorship of the 1960s - 1970s (McGuirk, 2014).
Historically, the biggest difficulty facing Brazil has always been the enormous
disparity of wealth between rich and poor. In the past several decades, this huge poverty
gap has resulted in favela communities effectively becoming breeding grounds for crime
and violence. The vast difference in quality infrastructure, transportation, education,
healthcare, and basic resources resulted in fewer employment opportunities; thereby
adding to the dramatically increasing social inequalities of Cariocas3 (Perlman, 2009).
The social divide this caused was extreme, and despite the high rate of economic growth
experienced over the past few decades, significant problems of social inequality and
income disparity are still very much seen today in modern-day Brazil.

Background of Gangs in Rio de Janeiro
By the mid-1980s, Rio de Janeiro was faced with new problems. Not only were
favela residents afraid of losing their housing to government clearance projects, but now
they faced even bigger issues. The result of Brazil’s unequal income distribution,
combined with endemic poverty, led to increasing crime and violence within poor
communities. Drug cartels, a common consequence of living in such a poverty-stricken
area, permeated throughout the favelas and caused the government and citizens massive
concern (Arias, 2006). Soon after, favela territory became a breeding ground for violence
between rival drug traffickers and Brazilian police. Thousands of innocent lives were

3

A native of Rio de Janeiro.
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caught in the crossfire, and until recently, the government did not implement any security
measures regarding the safety of favela residents (Daily Mail Reporter, 2013).
With this new tidal wave of crime flooding into Rio’s favelas and streets, there
emerged certain notorious drug cartels known for changing the face of crime in Brazil.
The first and most prominent gang was called the Comando Vermelho (Red Command)
(Penglase, 2008). Although statements from law enforcement claim this gang is
practically nonexistent today, they are still semi-active and are said to control a small
portion of the city’s most violent areas (Penglase, 2008). Born in the Candido Mendes
prison during the military dictatorship, this group learned sophisticated organizational
techniques from political revolutionaries stationed in the same prison unit (Leeds, 1996).
The terrible conditions within the prison caused an unusual amount of prisoners to band
together in order to survive the harsh conditions.
This new alliance between leftist militants and common street criminals resulted
in the Red Command becoming one of the more “professional” crime syndicates in South
America. Nurtured by the poverty of Rio’s favelas, the Red Command was able to
dramatically increase the amount of organized criminal activities within the area and soon
became heavily involved with the drug trafficking industry. In fact, after several turf
wars with rival gangs, the Red Command controlled the drug trade in 70 percent of Rio’s
favelas during the 1980s (Penglase, 2008).
Common activities associated with this group include: weapons and drug
trafficking (mainly cocaine and marijuana), car theft, robbery/street crime (especially
from tourists), and kidnapping for ransom (Masciola, n.d.). In addition, members of the
Red Command have been known to extort protection fees from favela businesses and
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obtain additional income from their monopoly on services such as van transportation and
pirated-cable TV (Leeds, 1996).
Another prominent gang in Brazil is the Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends).
Created between 1996-1998, this group originated from former members of the Red
Command, along with ex-soldiers and marines, police, ex-police and drug traffickers, and
is now considered one of Red Command’s main rivals. Amigos dos Amigos also joined
forces with an earlier faction of the Red Command, called Terceiro Comando (Third
Command) (Masciola, n.d.). Together, these two criminal groups quickly became a
dominant power within their home base of Rio’s largest favela, Rocinha (Amigos dos
Amigos, 2014). Recently, however, the group’s power in that region has been contested
due to the capture of former boss Antonio Francisco Bonfim Lopes in 2011 (Amigos dos
Amigos, 2014).
Although similar to Red Command’s organizational structure, Amigos dos
Amigos wanted to instill a different operating style within the favelas. Instead of
terrorizing favela residents, the group created a strict principle of reciprocity in order to
foster better relations with their neighbors, thus creating a possibility of future expansion
for their trafficking operations (Leeds, 1996). However, with the increased pressure from
Rio’s police and pacification program, rival gangs have begun tolerating each other in
order to retain their hold in the favelas. Since the end of the 2014 FIFA World Cup,
though, there has been a surge of drug dealers trying to move back to their old favela
communities (Amigos dos Amigos, 2014).
Surprisingly, most favela residents do not oppose the gangs’ presence. This is
mainly due to three things. First, criminal groups tend to use fear and scare tactics to
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consolidate their control in the favelas. If need be, gang members will intimidate
residents by randomly firing guns and publically showing off weapons to reinforce their
image of power (Penglase, 2008). However, there is also a second reason, called the
“patronage system.” Since favela residents technically live outside of the city’s grounds,
the residents are often offered social services by gangs in exchange for their support.
This is particularly true for the Red Command, and services offered include van
transportation, cable, youth development programs, public dance parties (bailes funk),
and provision of soccer fields (Neuwirth, 2002). In addition, some gangs even supply
school equipment, medicine, gas tanks for cooking, hospital visits, and money for funeral
arrangements. If anyone requests a larger favor, it is sent to Comando leaders in prison
who have the authority to withhold or grant the request (Penglase, 2008).
Thirdly, favela dwellers do not typically oppose major gangs due to what
residents call the “rule or law of the hillside.” This is essentially a “code” used in favelas
in which gang members do not allow petty or violent crime within the favelas in
exchange for residents’ silence regarding illegal activities (Penglase, 2008). For example,
the Red Command is known for carrying out executions inside its territory against
suspected and alleged thieves or rapists. Gangsters even hold their own “trials” before
carrying out sentences. The Red Command acts as an absolute power within their
communities and is the deciding authority when it comes to resident crime within their
claimed territory. The “code” is also administered for the purpose of manipulating their
control of the favelas and preventing police from entering tráfico (favela-based drug
traffickers) territory (Neuwirth, 2002).
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Unfortunately, a majority of high-level gangs in Rio de Janeiro have vast
connections to city police, which has made their trafficking operations much easier and
harder to combat. Police are not trusted within most favelas, and with their history of
violence against civilians and lawlessness in general, it is no wonder the residents of Rio
do not consider the state’s security forces as possible alternatives to the gangs occupying
favela territory (Penglase, 2008). Although not as militarized as during Brazil’s
dictatorship, corruption still runs rampant within the city’s security forces, and many
times the police accept monthly “taxes” to ignore trafficking operations (Penglase, 2008).
At times they also practice ‘mineira’, which means they detain someone for a crime like
trafficking, then demand payment for their release. Brazilian police have also been
heavily connected to weapons trafficking, earning income to make up for their lowpaying security jobs.
Even though there is a definite link between traffickers and police, the
relationship has often turned volatile. Many times there are shootouts between drug
traffickers and police, resulting in several deaths and injuries to innocent bystanders.
Recently there has been an increase in government aid to stop the onslaught of police
corruption and build a more trusting relationship amongst favela dwellers, but in the past,
many residents actually felt safer with the traffickers’ protection (Penglase, 2008). This
poses a huge problem for Rio’s law enforcement in their new pacification program to
clear favelas of traficantes (traffickers).
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The Face of Rio’s Inner-city Violence and its Lasting Effect
For the purpose of this thesis it is important to show how the above information
has affected present-day Brazil as well as how the government has responded to the vast
issues stemming from favela life. Using data from several reputable sources, this chapter
will attempt to establish the real threat that crime and violence continues to have on Rio’s
communities and surrounding neighborhoods. Despite being among the most influential
democracies in both regional and global affairs, Brazil continues to fight against very
serious human rights challenges (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). Some of these issues
include the huge threat of police brutality in response to the high levels of violent crime,
but this, along with similar problems, will be further discussed at a later point throughout
the chapter.
According to a 2014 study published by the Mexican Citizens’ Council for Public
Safety and Criminal Justice (CCSP-JP), Brazil had 19 cities rank in the top 50 of “most
violent cities in the world”- the most of any other country (Pachico, 2015). In fact, Brazil
has seen a significant increase in the number of cities making the list in just the past four
years. In 2011, there were 14 Brazilian cities that made the top 50; now there are 19.
What is even worse is that Brazil currently has four cities ranked in the world’s top 10
most violent, whereas in 2011 it only had two (Pachico, 2015).
Unlike other regions in South America, it may be difficult to understand what
makes a democratic and prosperous country like Brazil so dangerous, but upon further
analysis of this complex regional phenomenon, it is clear that certain factors emerge as
contributing to the establishment of the current criminal framework. Those factors can be
attributed to a whole host of things, but one could say the most prevalent are as follows:
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the rise in inequality, greater availability of firearms, increased drug use, and even the
changes in government structure.
Another big issue Brazil faces is the effort to reinvent citizens’ view of law
enforcement, especially within the states with high crime rates. Faced with high levels of
violent crime, some Brazilian police units engage in abusive practices with impunity,
instead of pursuing sound policing practices. Justice officials who seek to hold police
officers accountable for unlawful practices face threats of violence, which makes the
problem of corruption harder to combat. Brazil has long been known for political
corruption throughout both its past dictatorship and current democracy, and not
surprisingly, this is something that directly relates to the country’s crime problems.
To voice their opposition of government corruption, Brazilian citizens often use
protests as a way to bring international attention to this pervasive social problem. As
seen in the months leading to the 2014 World Cup, international spotlight was cast upon
Brazil for the multitude of anti-corruption protests regarding the government’s
overspending for hosting the soccer tournaments (Lewis & Kiernan, 2014). Instead of
focusing on the needs of the country, specifically concerning issues such as education,
health, infrastructure, and transportation, the government poured billions of dollars into
World Cup spending. As shown in Figure 1, estimated costs actually came to a price tag
of almost 11 billion dollars, which is more than half of the country’s entire education
budget for 2014.
Due to this extravagant overspending, the majority of residents in Brazil were
none too happy to find out how their tax dollars were being spent, especially as public
transportation and airfare began to rise dramatically as a result. With the wealth
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discrepancies in Brazil being one of the largest in the world, its economy “does not seem
to be improving much, and most people are finding it hard to get a job” (Chadha, 2014,
n.p.). While prices and cost of living continue to increase even more, Brazil’s
government does not seem to be putting in the effort needed to rise above their current
status. As illustrated by Figure 2, there is a high percentage of Brazilians dissatisfied
with World Cup spending, especially since there are problems within the country that
they feel are more important for the government to focus on.
Figure 1: Costs of hosting the 2014 World Cup

Source: Brazilian Government , IET (n.d.)
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Figure 2: Percentage of Brazilians dissatisfied with World Cup spending and
economic issues

Source: Pew Research Center (n.d.)

General Crime and Forms of Policing (What Works, What doesn’t, and
What’s Promising)
Crime prevention is a tough challenge for governments to take on, but based on
existing empirical studies there is enough evidence to suggest that certain programs work
while some do not. This thesis focuses heavily on this topic in regards to Brazil’s current
security situation, and though it is still a little too early to know the long-term
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ramifications of its new policing program, it is still beneficial to look at what the
literature says about crime prevention before deciding on a verdict.
A portion of the research used for this particular subject was done by referring to
George Mason University’s Center for Evidence-based Policing and the National Institute
of Justice’s Research in Brief. This Research in Brief is funded by the U.S. Department
of Justice, and although it was published quite a while ago (1997), this report is still
heavily cited and referenced within the Intelligence Community and various law
enforcement agencies. The key issues this report discusses are as follows:
1.) What works to prevent crime, especially youth violence?
2.) Out of all the hundreds of different strategies used in communities,
families, schools, labor markets, places, police, and criminal justice, which
ones succeed, and to what extent?
3.) What does the scientific evidence suggest about the effectiveness of
federally funded crime prevention?
Since these questions pertain to what this thesis is trying to answer, it makes sense
to include the findings of this report in the hopes it will shed light on how well Brazil’s
security programs are doing in curtailing the high levels of crime in some of its major
cities.
The report is based on a review of more than 500 prevention program evaluations
that meet minimum scientifically recognized standards and methodologies, such as
repeated tests under similar and different social settings. In the present work, the
researcher chose to focus on the areas of what works for high-crime hot spots and
delinquent and at-risk preadolescents. This independent review of the effectiveness of
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state and local crime prevention assistance programs reveals a special emphasis on
factors that relate to juvenile crime and the effect of these programs on youth violence.
These particular findings are especially important since youth violence and the problem
of youth gangs is a critical concern in South America. This issue is perceived as one of
the main drivers of violent crime in the region, but unfortunately there has not been much
empirical analysis of gangs within Latin America as of yet.
What studies do show is that youth, mainly young men, comprise the bulk of both
victims and perpetrators of violence in Central America. As seen in Figure 3 below, data
from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) suggest that the 15-29
and 30-44 age groups account for the vast majority of homicides globally, with 43 per
cent of all homicide victims aged 15-29.
Figure 3: Global homicide rate, by sex and age group (2012 or latest year)

Rate per 100,000 population
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013)
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In fact, the Americas is the region that possesses the greatest concentration of
victims aged 15-29 for both male and female. In addition, this UNODC study asserts that
the homicide rate for male victims aged 15-29 in South America and Central America is
more than four times the global average rate for that age group, shown by Figure 4 below
(Global Study on Homicides, 2013). This is estimated to be the cause of higher levels of
gang-related homicide in certain regions in the Americas, and this is why the
aforementioned Research in Brief, coupled with various other empirical studies, will help
this thesis determine the best ways to prevent this type of crime.
Figure 4: Homicide rates, by region and by sex (2012 or latest year)

Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013)

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Report attempts to measure: (a)“reductions
in delinquency, juvenile crime, youth gang activity, youth substance abuse, and other
high-risk factors; (b) reductions in the risk factors in the community, schools, and family
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environments that contribute to juvenile violence; and (c) increases in the protective
factors that reduce the likelihood of delinquency and criminal behavior” (Sherman,
Gottfredson, MacKenzie, Eck, Reuter, & Bushway, 1998). The programs this
Congressional Report examined include any that claim to prevent crime or drug abuse,
especially youth violence, as well as the effects of these programs on risk and protective
factors for youth violence and drug abuse. The institutional settings that this thesis will
focus on are within communities and also those completed by police. These programs
will be further evaluated by the science of measuring program effects in order to provide
a consistent and reasonably objective way to draw conclusions regarding cause and
effect. Although no conclusion is permanent, the authors of this report used evidence for
or against certain programs based on the impact they made on crime to distinguish which
programs worked the best and which ones showed little impact.
Based on their findings, the NIJ report concluded that community-based crime
prevention programs could not be proved as 100% effective at preventing crime, but they
noted that several of these programs can be found under “promising.” This is interesting
considering the majority of today’s police departments in the United States incorporate
the community-based policing strategy. In a 2014 survey conducted by the Police
Executive Research Forum, (PERF) law enforcement agencies were asked questions such
as, “What crime fighting strategies does your agency use currently” (COPS, 2014, p.2)?
The results shown in Table 1 below reveal that 94% chose Community Policing as their
number one strategy.
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Table 1: PERF Survey Answers

Source: Police Executive Research Forum (2014)

In correlation with this information, authors William Bratton and William
Andrews (2010) published a magazine article in the Americas Quarterly explaining their
thoughts on what caused the violent crime rate to decrease in the United States over the
past twenty years. Their claim is that, after years of remote and disengaged policing
tactics, community policing ideas “pushed police departments to reconnect with local
communities, decentralize operations and work in partnership with citizens to prevent
crime” (Bratton, 2010). It is easy to see that even though the NIJ report categorized
community policing as just “promising,” many institutions use it as both an acceptable
and preferred way of problem-solving within communities and neighborhoods.
One of the strategies the report found to work involved extra police patrols in high
crime hot spots for the purpose of reducing crime in those places. This conclusion was
based on Dr. Christopher Koper’s (1995) study entitled, “Just enough police presence:
Reducing crime and disorderly behavior by optimizing patrol time in crime hot spots.”
Koper (1995), an Associate Professor in the Department of Criminology, Law and
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Society at George Mason University and a senior fellow in George Mason’s Center for
Evidence-Based Crime Policy, used his study to examine whether longer instances of
police presence would create lasting effects on crime and disorder. To support his study,
Koper (1995) used observational data collected during the Minneapolis hot spots
experiment in which observers would visit hot spots at random times to record factors
such as police presence, crime, and disorder. Findings for this study found that police
have the potential to maximize the reduction of crime and disorder by implementing
“proactive” 10-15 minute stops at hot spot locations during random, sporadic times. This
is said to maximize deterrence along with minimizing the amount of unnecessary time
spent at hot spots (Koper, 1995).
In addition, the study claims that installing rehabilitation programs that use
treatments appropriate to adult and juvenile offenders’ risk factors reduces their repeat
offending rates (Andrews, 1990). However, arrests of juveniles for minor offenses can
often cause them to become more delinquent in the future; this study suggests that the
better choice would be for police to exercise discretion to either warn them or use other
alternatives. Specifically related to Brazil’s case, increased arrests or raids on drug
markets “fail to reduce violent crime or disorder for more than a few days, if at all.” On
the other hand, the report states that if police show greater respect to arrested offenders, it
may result in reducing repeat offending (Andrews, 1990).
On a case by case basis, certain aspects of community-based mentoring, such as
Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America, have been known to reduce drug abuse (Crime
Solutions, n.d.). Community-based afterschool recreation programs may also reduce
juvenile crime in areas immediately surrounding the recreation center. In an analysis of
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the Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment regarding arrested offenders, policing
with greater respect to offenders reduced repeat offending (Paternoster, 1997) and
increased respect for the law and police. In North Carolina, an experiment using intense
supervision and aftercare of first-time minor juvenile offenders, such as runaways and
truants, decreased future offending relative to offenders who did not receive enhanced
surveillance and services. In a similar experiment, Pennsylvania created a program with
the same type of intense supervision and aftercare of serious juvenile offenders; this
resulted in a reduction of rearrests compared to putting offenders on probation
(Sontheimer, 1993).
On the topic of gangs, practitioners and researchers generally agree that success in
responding to gangs requires an appropriate balance of “effective prevention,
intervention, enforcement, and reentry activities” (Office of Justice Programs, 2009) One
of the main determinants of joining a gang in the first place, though, is the background
and childhood of the gang member growing up. Sample studies of American children
exposed to violence found that, within one year, “60 percent were exposed to violence,
crime, or abuse in their homes, schools, and communities” and that “almost 40 percent of
American children were direct victims of 2 or more violent acts, and 1 in 10 were victims
of violence 5 or more times” (Finkelhor, Turner, Ormrod, & Hamby, 2009, n.p.). In fact,
statistics from 2005 show that juvenile and young adults ages 12 to 19 were more than
twice as likely to be victims of violent crimes than the population as a whole (Baum,
2005).
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These statistics suggest that poly-victimization4 could be one of the reasons youth
become attracted to joining gangs or getting involved with criminal activities. Factors
that are known to increase children’s risk of being exposed to violence include: age,
gender, race and ethnicity, family structure, family alcohol problems/drug use, intimate
partner violence, peer delinquency, and prior victimization (Finklehor et al., 2009). The
outcomes of early exposure to violence can result in psychological and/or physical
problems, academic and/or behavioral difficulties, and delinquency and offending.
Successful practices recommended by the Office of Justice Programs (Office of Justice
Programs, 2009) include the following:


Engaging and intervening with both the parent and child



Combined home-based and center-based approaches



Multi-modal approaches (combining individual, group, family, advocacy, casemanagement and/or combining treatment approaches)



Parent training as prevention and intervention



Psycho-educational roles for all providers across all aspects of the continuum



System partners that interact with children and families from prevention to
response

Lastly, certain social programs created for youth have shown to be very effective with
regard to keeping children out of trouble and providing activities and academic tutoring.
These programs strive to promote positive outcomes by providing opportunities, fostering
positive relationships, and giving the support needed to build on their strengths as well as

4

Term that describes individuals who have experienced multiple victimizations of different kinds,
such as sexual assault and bullying, or witnessing intimate partner violence and physical abuse.
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prevent risky behaviors. While researching youth development programs, I came across
several well-known programs that have proven promising. However, since there are
hundreds of programs available for review, and most being quite similar, I have selected
a couple that are most suited to the problem areas concerning youth within favelas and
ones with high ratings of promise/effectiveness.
Most Americans are familiar with Big Brothers Big Sisters (BBBS), which is a
community-based mentoring program that offers one-to-one mentoring in a community
setting for at-risk youth between the ages of 6 and 18. These youth often come from
single-parent households and low-income neighborhoods. In a lot of cases, the children
are coping with the stress of parental incarceration. The program targets those who are at
high risk of exposure to violence and trauma at home and in the community. This
particular program is associated with a significant reduction in initiating drug and alcohol
use and anti-social behavior among mentored youth. In addition, youth who were
actively involved with BBBS had more emotional support and better relationships with
family and peers. Academic performance, however, did not seem to improve from this
program (Crime Solutions, 2014).
The second program I wanted to discuss is probably not as widely known as the first.
It is called Functional Family Therapy (FFT) and it is a family-based
prevention/intervention program veered toward at-risk youths aged 11 to 18. The
children in this program are generally at risk for delinquency, violence, substance use, or
other behavioral problems. FFT uses a clinical model that concentrates on decreasing
risk factors and increasing protective factors that directly affect adolescents, with a
particular emphasis on familial factors. One of the studies(Crime Solutions, 2014) that
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implemented this program, “An Outcome-Based Evaluation of Functional Family
Therapy for Youth with Behavioral Problems,” was completed in 2013 and found that the
Life Domain (LD), Child Behavior Emotional Needs (CB), and Child Risk Behavior
(CR) scales of the Strengths and Needs Assessment (SNA) showed “significantly greater
improvements in the FFT group compared with the control group” (Crime Solutions,
2014). In addition, the findings suggest that FFT “had a positive effect on youths in the
areas of reducing risk behavior, increasing strengths, and improving functioning across
key life domains” (Crime Solutions, 2014).
An older study on the same program (Gordon, 1988) showed great effectiveness
as well, but in a different area. Researchers conducted a large-scale trial in the 1980s that
followed Alexander’s behavioral-systems family therapy model. This trial targeted lower
socioeconomic status juvenile offenders, most of whom had multiple offenses, including
misdemeanors and felonies. Details of the study involve male and female delinquents
who had recently been placed out of the home or for whom placement was imminent.
The teens were court referred to in-home, time-unlimited family therapy (about 16
sessions). To balance the study, a comparison group of the same number of lower risk
delinquents received only probation. The outcome was measured by the number and
severity of offenses during a 2½-year period following group assignment (Gordon, 1988).
The study found that for any 12-month period, the recidivism rate averaged 1.29 offenses
for the FFT group and 10.29 offenses for the comparison group (Gordon, 1988). Overall,
the average annual recidivism rates for the groups during the entire follow-up period
(27.8 months) were “5 percent for the treatment group and 25.0 percent for the
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comparison group” (Crime Solutions, 2014). The delinquents receiving the family
therapy had a recidivism rate of 11% versus 67% for the comparison group.

Problems with Incarceration and Prison Rates
One of the more interesting ideas from the NIJ study suggested implementing
prison-based vocational education programs for adult inmates within federal prisons.
This idea would be especially suited if adapted to a country like Brazil since it has the
fourth largest prison population in the world, only behind Russia, the United States, and
China. In fact, the country’s prison population grew by 74% between the years 2005 2012, totaling more than half a million detainees (Alves, 2015).
Not only is it one of the world’s largest systems, Brazil’s prison population is also
one of the most crowded. The prison system in Brazil composes 1,598 facilities, which
are vastly overcrowded. To demonstrate, the official capacity of the prison system is
348,000 with regard to prisons and 7,000 in police facilities. In December of 2013, there
were a total of 581,000 inmates, which brings occupancy level to 163% in that year alone
(Bruha, 2015). The likelihood of solving this problem is low due to the high rate of
criminal recidivism in the country. Upwards of 70% of all released inmates end up reoffending (Bruha, 2015), following close behind the United States’ rate of 76.6%
(Durose, 2014).
Even more alarming is the recent debate throughout Brazil regarding whether
teenagers who commit violent crimes can be rehabilitated, or should be tried as adults
and incarcerated in the country’s packed and dangerous prisons. If Congress passes the
proposal, it will lower the age of criminal responsibility from 18 to 16 (Justice, 2015).
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Currently, Brazilian law states that teenage offenders are to be detained for a maximum
of just three years at “educational centers” in order to be “re-socialized” (Phillips, 2015).
Those who are under 12 years are not punished at all, and offenders 12 to 17 years of age
face the same maximum sentence of three years in detention centers; no matter the crime.
Lowering the criminal responsibility to 16 makes sense, especially if the crime
committed is one of extreme violence. For example, in 2007 there was a case in Rio
where four armed men, including an 18 year old boy and his 16 year old friend, carjacked
a woman in the north suburbs. The woman’s six year old son was in the back seat, but
when she tried to pull him from the car he got tangled in the seatbelt. As the assailants
sped off with the car, the little boy was dragged outside the car for about seven
kilometers (4.3 miles), resulting in his death; presumably by decapitation since the head
and body were found in separate locations (Globo, 2007).
Normally, in a case such as this, one would think all criminals involved would be
severely punished; yet the 16 year old was assigned to a one to three year stint in a
juvenile reform institution because, according to Brazil’s legal majority law, a person
younger than 17 is not mature enough to answer for the consequences of his actions and
should be judged differently. In most countries, the legal majority varies depending on
the situation, but in Brazil the legal age is 18 years old for absolutely everything. Also,
because of Brazil’s strict “hard-and-fast” rule regarding age, those who commit heinous
crimes will still receive the maximum sentence for their age. This means that if a 16 year
old serial killer was to kill 15 people, he would face the same sentence (up to three years
in a detention center) as if he had killed one; there is no way to extend a longer sentence.
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However, since the other boys in the 2007 trial were 18 and older, they received a
maximum of 39-45 years in prison, all able to appeal their sentences (BBC News, 2008).
The savagery of this crime stunned Brazil, and as a result, lawmakers drafted the
new bill that would lower the age of criminal responsibility from 18 years to 16. In
opposition to the proposal, Brazil’s justice minister, Jose Eduardo Cardozo, stated in a
hearing of the congressional Human Rights and Minorities Committee that, in his
judgment, the prisons are “in no condition to receive youths who will be judged as
adults" (Justice, 2015). This is because a good part of societal violence is ordered from
within the prisons, so it essentially makes them crime schools that continue to breed more
hardened criminals. Cardozo adds that “[since] we know this, [why would we] place
children and teenagers inside the prisons to be captured by those criminal organizations”
(Justice, 2015)? Cardozo believes that Brazil needs an alternative to reducing the age of
criminal responsibility, and many agree that lawmakers should instead increase the
confinement time for teenagers who commit serious crimes, as well as doubling the
sentences for adults who induce minors to commit crimes (Justice, 2015).
But are the juvenile detention centers really that much better than prison? In a
report published by Amnesty International (AI) called Brazil: A waste of lives: FEBEM5
juvenile detention centres in Sao Paulo: A human rights crisis, not a public security
issue, AI reports that over the past several decades they have received numerous stories
of torture, ill-treatment, and cruel, inhuman, and degrading conditions of detention
centers affecting hundreds of adolescents (Amnesty International, 2000). In addition,

5

Fundação do Bem-Estar do Menor; Portuguese for the “Foundation for the Well-Being of

Minors”
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there have been a number of boys who died in violent circumstances because of
negligence and no protection by staff.
Specific cases in Rio de Janeiro include boys being held in overcrowded detention
centers with no activities and regular beatings by monitores6. Boys are known by
number, not name, and they must line up in order of age when ordered. According to one
of the boys interviewed by AI, if they do not obey orders they are taken to a room and
beaten around the head and stomach, as happened to him for allowing a younger boy to
stand in front of him in a line. In past years, human rights organizations have tried to
visit these juvenile detention centers, but have been refused access (Amnesty
International, 2000). When the teens are eventually released, recidivism rates are as high
among child offenders as adults.

Government’s Efforts to Lessen Crime
In any nation, preventing crime is a very difficult task, especially if it is in a
rapidly developing country such as Brazil. Even more than in the United States, slavery
here created a vast lower class and extreme inequalities. According to the World Bank,
“40.9 percent of Brazil’s 155 million inhabitants live below the poverty line and the
richest 10 percent own more than half the nation’s wealth” (Brazil Abolishes Slavery,
1999). As Brazil is a fairly new democracy, it is not surprising that several bad habits
from its dictatorship continue to flow into the current administration.
To illustrate how current racism and corruption exist throughout Brazil, human
rights workers claim that local law enforcement and judges have conspired with slave

6

Warders

33

owners, and none have ever successfully been prosecuted for violating the law banning
enslavement (Brazil Abolishes Slavery, 1999). According to the African American
Registry, a church worker who condemned a federal congressman for owning slaves in
1992 was convicted of slander and sentenced to a year in jail (Brazil Abolishes Slavery.)
To many people this seems unfathomable, but what I found during my time abroad in this
country is that most outsiders do not realize Brazil’s troubles are not merely drug or
gang-related—their causes run much deeper, and involve the nature of man. The present
effects of this are seen in the fact that the cost of corruption within Brazil’s government
was estimated to be upwards of 53 billion dollars in 2013 (Kadiyala). Faced with this
information and given its crime-ridden reputation, one of the main questions I had to ask
during my research was how well are Brazil’s police doing in tackling the problem?
Beginning in 2008, Rio de Janeiro State authorities developed special police units
called “Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora” (UPP), or “Pacifying Police Units”. The
establishment of the pacifying police program was based on the idea of “community
policing,” where 24-hour police units maintain a physical presence within the favelas.
The goal of these units is to make the favela streets safer by removing drug traffickers,
militias, and all signs of the drug and arm trade. In other words, it is essentially a
program to ‘take back territories’ that have long been neglected by Rio’s public
authorities. Before the implementation of the UPP, areas containing favelas were
considered completely lawless. Crimes were rarely reported to police, and when police
were actually present it usually meant there would soon be an armed conflict between
police and criminal groups. Now that the pacifying police units are in place, there is new
hope for a safer future for favela residents (Stahlberg, n.d.).
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Unfortunately, the question of how well Brazil’s police are doing in tackling
Rio’s crime is very difficult to answer considering the many different opinions on the
subject, specifically regarding the UPP Program. There are critics of the program who
believe it is just another unsuccessful attempt by Brazilian politicians to show the world
they are doing everything they can to provide safety and security for citizens and
foreigners alike. On the other hand there are those who fully support the new policing
program, saying it has given more protection and mobility to favela residents along with
increased tourism opportunities. However, the focus of this thesis is to explore the current
and future strategies of Brazil’s security personnel in stabilizing favelas and whether they
will work long-term, so it is prudent to discuss both sides of this highly debated topic.
For starters, those who oppose the UPP Program insist that the only reason the
government began making an effort to clean up the city’s crime problem was for
international attention after Brazil found out it had won the bid for the 2014 World Cup
and 2016 Summer Olympics. Critics have also pointed out that the only favelas the
government seems to be targeting are those in wealthy areas of the city (Daily Mail
Reporter, 2013). This essentially does nothing for long-term gain or stability since
traffickers and their associated violence are only temporarily displaced to the poorer areas
of Rio.
Another good example of why many citizens do not support this security program
is due to Brazil’s long history of police repression. Police brutality has become the norm
for much of the working class, and it is hard for many citizens to see the police in a
different light. Because of this, most favela residents, and a good percentage of those
outside the favelas, have grown to fear and hate the police forces instead of respecting
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them. Viewing the police as part of the problem has caused a definite issue when it comes
to asking whether residents feel comfortable with the constant presence of security
personnel in their neighborhoods. There will always be those who distrust the police and
would rather them stay out of favela life, even if it means foregoing potential protection
for their family.
However, not everyone in Brazil thinks so badly of Rio’s pacification initiative.
Advocates of this program understand that violence only begets more violence, so they
are more willing to overlook the prior history of Brazil’s police force in order to focus on
the potential good that could come if UPP’s goals are met. Statements from several
public figures and even some citizens have claimed that UPP policing is a successful
solution to urban public security issues, and José Mariano Beltrame, Security Secretary of
Rio de Janeiro, states that “this program is not just a security project; it is a State policy
of life improvement and hope development to the people of Rio de Janeiro” (UPP, n.d.).
Because of the many positive attributes associated with the pacifying police units, I will
attempt to cover their current achievements in the following paragraphs. Afterwards, I
will discuss whether the mentioned actions and activities of Rio’s UPP task force will
likely stabilize the favelas as much as authorities propose it will.
One of the key issues surrounding the program will be the task of regaining the
confidence of the inhabitants in the areas with UPP presence. The objective of Rio de
Janeiro’s security forces was never intended to fully eliminate drug trafficking; this task
would be nearly impossible. According to the official UPP website, the main goals of
the program were the following: 1) To regain control of territories previously dominated
by armed drug factions and establish democratic rule of law in those places, 2) To ensure
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peace for these communities, 3) To help to break the logic of war existent in the state
(UPP, n.d.). Even though each UPP is administratively bound to a Military Police
Battalion, they are essentially still separate entities. Unlike previous police battalions,
each UPP officer is supposed to be trained specifically in “community approximation and
given a basic education in human rights” (Ashcroft, 2014). In addition, UPP officers are
usually newer, younger recruits in the hopes of limiting links to the corrupt practices of
former police generations.
The form of policing UPP has tried to incorporate in their program is one of
community policing. As mentioned before, community policing has existed for many
decades and chooses to focus more on the cause of crime rather than the prevention. It
can also be considered as a problem-solving technique where police switch from
exclusively taking care of incidents to developing long-term, preventive solutions for
community problems (Lincoln Police Department, n.d.). Collaboration between the
community and police is something the Rio state government is striving to do with the
UPP program, but the majority of law enforcement still has a “zero tolerance” mindset
when it comes to the favelas.
Because of this mindset, there is a question of whether Rio’s pacification
initiative truly embraces the concept of “community policing.” For starters, components
of community-oriented policing are primarily established by problem solving,
administrative decentralization, and protection of the public while respecting human
rights (Docobo, 2005). Brazil’s past relationship between law enforcement and poor
communities has cast doubt in the minds of many that the government can really install
community-oriented policing in poor regions of Rio. Yet even though there is much
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doubt, there is also much hope for the program’s success. In a speech by the Secretary of
Security, José Mariano Beltrame, one can see the hope of change:

It is necessary to respond to the population’s demand. We used to have the old
speech: there is no school, there is no doctor because there is no security. Now
there is security. Let the services come. Rio de Janeiro’s population needs to be
more active, demand more from its governors, its politicians. To know from
whom they can demand. The police will create the peaceful environment for other
people to solve. The more we value citizenship, the less security will be needed.
(Riccio, Ruediger, Ross, & Skogan, 2013).
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Since favelas are sometimes considered sensitive in describing the profound class
and racial divisions of Brazil, access to certain information often depends on the social
skills and political contacts of the individual researcher. Therefore, I chose to conduct
qualitative data [on the current/future strategies that Rio’s state government will use to
stabilize Rio’s favelas] by interviewing high ranking security personnel from various
sectors of law enforcement. The interviews were semi-structured, consisting of ten base
questions, and allowed room for the interviewees to add additional and pertinent
information.
The following questions guided this study:
1. What are the current tactics that UPP and BOPE use to reduce drug trafficking
and stabilize favelas?
2. Have these tactics been modified in any way?
3. Are there plans to implement new strategies in the future?
4. Has UPP presence helped Brazil’s efforts in “cleaning up” the favelas?
-

What statistics or evidence is there that shows this?

5. What are the ultimate goals of Rio’s government in this endeavor?
-

How long do they predict it will take?

6. Do you think the current or future tactics work/will work?
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7. Are there other ways to reduce crime and violence in the favelas besides constant
police presence and interference?
8. Are there any counterproductive strategies that have proven unreliable or
inadequate?
9. Why do you think some people do not support the UPP program?
10. What agencies are involved in the UPP pacification program?
Before selecting my interviewees, I conducted thorough research on the
best potential subjects, giving extra credence to a person’s work experience, years on the
job, rank/position, availability, and willingness to answer my chosen questions. In
addition to these aspects, I also wanted to stay within agencies that were actively
involved in the pacification program. Those agencies consisted of the public security
department of the state, military police, and the civil police.
In the beginning stages of selection, I planned to interview five people of differing
perspectives. However, upon arriving in Brazil, a few of my top choices were not
available to talk due to busy schedules during Brazil’s 2015 presidential election.
Because of this, I was only able to interview three of the five original subjects. The
positions of these subjects are as follows:7
1.) Federal officer with 25 years experience in the Departamento de Polícia Federal
(Federal Police Department; equivalent to the United States’ FBI).
2.) High ranking inspector with 25 years experience within the Civil Police and
Department of Public Security.

7

See Table 2 in Chapter 4 for interviewees’ answers.
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3.) High ranking member of BOPE (Special Police Operations Battalion); served for
19 years.
One of the difficulties during the interview process was having to conduct the
interviews in Portuguese. The reasons for doing this were to receive a more accurate
response to the questions asked and to make the interviewees more comfortable by using
their native language since the majority could not speak English very well. I kept a
notepad to write down anything that stuck out to me with regard to the questions asked or
additional information the interviewee relayed. In addition to taking notes, the
interviewees granted me permission to record the interactions in order to later transcribe
them into written form for closer study.
After the interviews were complete, I translated them to English and asked several
Brazilian scholars to look over my translations for any mistakes or Brazilian slang that I
did not recognize.
Following my review of each recorded interview, I noticed that common themes
emerged regarding the four most important questions:
1.) What are the tactics that UPP and BOPE use to reduce drug trafficking and
stabilize favelas?
2.) How successful have they been?
3.) What new/future tactics do they intend to use?
4.) Based on existing empirical studies, what is the likelihood that these new tactics
will be successful?
A more detailed analysis of the answers to the above questions will be further
discussed in the results section of Chapter 4. Broadly speaking, however, the most
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common themes that evolved from these interviews dealt with the interviewees’ beliefs
that the Pacification Program is working to reduce crime. In addition, all three
interviewees admitted there are other activities needed to reduce crime and violence, such
as social programs and education. Also, all interviewees added that it is unrealistic for
outsiders to think the UPP can pacify the whole State of Rio indefinitely. Lastly, when
asked, the majority of interviewees refrained from commenting on whether the UPP
program was placed there solely for the purpose of decreasing international concern when
picked to host the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND SUMMARY
Initially, the UPP program showed great promise for reducing crime. As seen in
Figure 5 below, between 2008-2012, lethal violence fell by 65% in pacified communities
(Glickhouse, 2015). Short-term results show a positive impact on safety. However,
violence began rising again in 2013.

Figure 5. Homicide rates per 100,000 (State of Rio de Janeiro)

Source: Rio de Janeiro State Department of Security (2014)

43

The recent resurgence in violence is likely caused by various factors. One theory
that an interviewee mentioned was that Brazil’s borders are a huge problem for security.
This interviewee is a member of BOPE, and states that “a more effective border control
over the entry of arms and drugs would help a lot” in efforts to reduce crime and violence
in the favelas. Also, Rio’s top security official, Jose Mariano Beltrame, blamed their
recent stray bullet problem on Brazil’s porous borders. A June 2014 United Nations
(UN) report found that between 2009 to 2013, Brazil had the second highest number of
stray bullet incidents in Latin America; Venezuela being the first. From 2007 to 2011,
the number of people hit by stray bullets actually fell from 258 to 81, but in 2012, stray
bullet injuries came up again, resulting in 111 cases in 2013 (Glickhouse, 2015).
Regarding the most important questions of this study (as discussed in Chapter 3),
I found that Rio de Janeiro’s police forces do not have any new strategies in place for the
future; at least not publicly. The Pacifying Police Units currently implement a process of
“tactical intervention, police occupation, installation, evaluation, and monitoring.” These
strategies will remain the same in the future, with the addition of better technology,
human resources, and training. Table 2 on the following pages shows respondents’
answers to the 10 security questions mentioned in Chapter 3’s methodology.
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Table 2: Q&A from Security Respondents
Questions:

Interviewee # 1
Federal Officer

Interviewee # 2
Civil Police Inspector

Interviewee # 3
B.O.P.E. official

1. What are the
current tactics that
UPP and BOPE use
to reduce drug
trafficking and
stabilize favelas?

I know from public
knowledge that
BOPE’s task force
enters the favelas to
find weapons and
drugs before the
pacifying police units
arrive.

UPP intervention: set
up police stations in
favelas to start social
programs and set up a
permanent presence.

Tactical intervention,
police occupation,
installation,
evaluation, and
monitoring.

2. Have these tactics
been modified in any
way?

Not that I know of.

They are basically the Depends on the size
same for every favela. and history of each
community.

3. Are there plans to
implement new
strategies in the
future?

I do not have the
answer to this
question.

The UPP program is
based on community
involvement, which I
assume will continue.

Yes; a development
of the expansion of
the current program.

4a. Has UPP presence
helped Brazil’s
efforts in “cleaning
up” the favelas?

Statistically, I believe
it has helped with
homicides in most
favelas with pacified
police units.
There are less calls of
murder in the area.

I will say that UPP
presence has helped,
but there are
difficulties in getting
residents to trust the
police.

“I did not understand
the term “clean”. I
believe the question is
regarding the
contribution of the
removal of assault
rifles, but they are not
manufactured in
Brazil.”

4b. What statistics or
evidence is there that
shows this?

I can not provide upto-date statistics or
evidence of this.

I do not have any data
with me to show, but
there are government
websites that have
official statistics.

In the past 23 years,
there was a tendency
of reduction in cases
of intentional
homicide in the state
(-47.98%).
In the last 5
years the reduction
was 22.02% in
violent actions
against life and this is
directly related to the
implementation of
UPP.

Law enforcement in
Brazil does not have a
good system of
sharing information
with other agencies;
this is why so little
crime is solved.
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5a. What are the
ultimate goals of
Rio’s government in
this endeavor?

From what I know,
the government
would like to take
back favela territory
that drug traffickers
have claimed. They
want residents to feel
more included in
normal society.

The main goals
consist of promoting
better relations with
the community and
installing a permanent
police presence. Also,
helping people in
favelas to live a better
life without the worry
of gangs.

5b. How long do they
predict it will take?

I can not speak to this You can never tell
question. I don’t
with these kinds of
have that information. things, but the
Secretary of Public
Security wants a
permanent UPP
presence in at least 35
favelas before the
World Cup.

6. Do you think the
current or future
tactics work/will
work?

Brazil is a country
that solves only 3 –
5% of its crimes, so I
think the tactics of
UPP will help with
the drug problems
and other crimes in
the favelas.

I think the UPP
program is doing the
best it can under the
circumstances.
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To measure the
operational efficiency
within institutions
involved in producing
better results in
controlling crime in
the state in strategic,
tactical, and
operational levels.
N/A

It is understood that
the more technology
we can use and the
better we qualify our
human resources, the
more qualified we
will be in providing
public security
services. This will
allow others to
become more
confident in police
authority, creating
ambience within
communities.

7. Are there other
ways to reduce crime
and violence in the
favelas besides
constant police
presence and
interference?

Yes, but in Brazil it is
different than the
United States. Here it
is very difficult to get
things done because
of all the
bureaucracy. Our
presidents “wash their
hands” of security
matters and leave it to
each state, but they
are not given enough
money for good
programs.

I think that yes, there
are other ways. But
putting UPPs in the
communities are very
important as well.
This is one of our
primary concerns.

8. Are there any
counterproductive
strategies that have
proven unreliable or
inadequate?

I don’t know for
certain, because
federal police are not
involved in this area.
But as with any
country I am sure.

I would say only in
the past did we have
bad policing
strategies.

Not that I know of.

9. Why do you think
some people do not
support the UPP
program?

I would assume it is
because the
government left
favela communities
alone for a long time;
they ignored the
people there and
allowed crime to
flourish.

Because of the many
years of police abuse
and mistreatment of
the people during
Brazil’s dictatorship.
Many people
disappeared during
this time, and many
others were unjustly
imprisoned.

Some do not believe
that the pacification
program is
sustainable in logical
terms if you take into
account the number
of favelas to be
reached and the
state’s ability to
produce police to
cope with demand.

10. What agencies are We, [the federal
involved in the UPP
police] are not
pacification program? involved. BOPE and
military police are
involved first
followed by civil.

Civil police and
military police.
There are
subordinates of each
division.

The public security
department of the
state, especially the
military police and
subsidiarily the civil
police.

I do not think the
term “interference” is
good to use.

Yes. Sanitation,
garbage collection,
documents and titles
to property, access to
justice, and quality of
basic education are
essential and
complementary to
police action.
Also, more effective
border control over
the entry of arms and
drugs.

The interviewees were clear that the government seems to be content with their
current security tactics. The claimed success rate of the pacification program varies, with
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the majority stating that, due to the implementation of UPP, there has been a reduction of
intentional homicide cases in the state as well as cases involving armed robbery and
police resistance. Overall, the individuals who were interviewed mostly agreed that the
UPP program has resulted in decreased violence and safer communities. On the other
hand, relevant literature on this topic, as well as information from one of the
interviewees, suggests that particular categories of crime have actually risen, such as nonlethal violence and street crime. An increase in the number of missing persons over the
last few years of UPP implementation was also found. According to figures from Rio
state’s Institute of Public Safety, between the years 2007 to 2013, 35,000 people went
missing in Rio (Rodriguez, 2013).
Finally, based on existing empirical studies, what is the likelihood that UPP’s new
tactics will be successful? Since my study did not reveal any new tactics that UPP plan
to use in the future, besides their current practices, it is too early to tell the success of
anything they may add in the next several years. Presently, however, there is still a
debate among law enforcement, media, and citizens about the real success of the
program. According to the BOPE interviewee, there are many people who do not believe
the pacification efforts are sustainable in logical terms when taking into account the
number of favelas to be reached in the state of Rio and the state’s ability to “produce
police” to cope with the demand.

Future Strategies and Likely Success
As mentioned earlier, some of the future strategies the interviewees proposed for
the government consisted of social programs and basic education/sanitation within the
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favelas. Presently, the current tactics that UPP uses to reduce drug trafficking are loosely
based on the United States’ “community policing” model. According to the Rio de
Janeiro Government’s home page, the UPP program is:
a concept that goes beyond the community police approach and has its strategy
based on the partnership between local residents and law enforcement institutions.
The pacifying police approach, which is guided by dialogue and respect to the
culture and uniqueness of each community, eases conversations and stimulates the
growth of local leaders. (UPP - Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, 2015).
So far, this is the only model of action that the participants mentioned, and one
they believe is working. Yet even though community policing is normally praised
throughout America, it is not viewed the same in Brazil; mainly due to Brazil’s past
problems with corrupt government, police, and military.
Although Rio State’s current law enforcement practices are modeled after
community policing, favela residents and media outlets still show high criticism of Rio’s
security efforts. Besides the UPP program, there are no additional programs the
government is considering putting in place within the favelas, and because of this, it does
not seem likely that Rio’s pacification efforts will be enough to produce long-term
stability or reduction in crime.

However, if Rio’s government was to introduce

better social programs like those mentioned in Chapter 2, as well as ideas stated by the
security personnel I interviewed, this could dramatically reduce the number of youth
being recruited for illegal activity. In addition, the likely success of these proposed social
programs could potentially give favela residents a better view of Rio’s government,
thereby enacting trust and reliability on a government that has not been present in many
decades.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Throughout my research on crime and security in Brazil, it became obvious that
the country still has considerable challenges in meeting the whole population's needs for
education, health care, and income. However, Rio de Janeiro’s state government seems
to be on the right track with the UPP program. Although Rio’s pacification methods are
not exactly standard community policing, the program has had to deal with the police’s
tarnished reputation after years of corruption and abuse, so it would not be fair to call the
program a failure as of yet. This thesis attempted to present the risks, opportunities,
mistakes and achievements of the Pacifying Police Units, and it intends to give a clearer
picture of the likelihood that these police units can make a real change.

Overview of Chapters
In the previous chapters, we learned several important things that I will briefly
recap in the next few paragraphs. First, we learned about Brazil’s status as an upcoming
world leader in global economics, as well as the history of favelas and the start of
Brazil’s famous crime-ridden regions. We also covered information regarding notorious
gangs that were created in Brazil’s dangerous prisons, such as the Red Command and
Amigos dos Amigos, and how they have affected life in the favelas. Though the
government claims these gangs have been taken over during police occupation of favelas,
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we were also given evidence that they only moved to outer cities and are now attempting
to take back control over their old territories.
In addition, we learned how Brazil’s past dictatorship caused a rift between
citizens, police, and government, and how human rights challenges from the latter two
have shaped the way the new UPP program is viewed by residents and foreigners alike.
Other challenges demonstrated in this thesis included Brazilians’ unhappiness with the
government’s overspending in preparation for the World Cup and Olympic Games, and
most importantly, the favelas’ representation of poverty and inequality within Brazil. We
then shifted to relevant literature regarding crime and forms of policing that have proved
effective or not effective. Since this topic is one of the key areas of this thesis, it provides
an in-depth overview of many different programs and studies that pertain to the question
of what, based on existing empirical studies, is the likelihood that the UPP program’s
tactics will be successful?
The results from the literature review found that most instances where law
enforcement implemented community policing worked to derail crime or at least have a
positive impact on the region and population. Research also showed that certain social
programs geared toward at-risk youth were rated effective in their goals of preventing
youth violence and delinquency in most cases. Two programs mentioned were Big
Brothers Big Sisters and Functional Family Therapy. In my opinion, these programs, or
similar ones, could work in Rio’s favelas if incorporated the right way. Many youth in
Brazil’s favelas are exposed to high levels of violence on a daily basis, and research
shows that when kids become involved in social programs and parents become more
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involved in their children’s activities, there is a less likelihood that youth will get
involved in criminal behavior.
The next couple of sections describe the prison problems in Brazil with regard to
high levels of incarceration, recidivism, and overcrowding. Brazil has the fourth largest
prison population in the world, only behind Russia, the United States, and China. This
issue pertains to both adults and youth, and we learn about the recent debate regarding
Brazilian lawmakers’ proposal to lower the age of criminal responsibility from 18 to 16.
Currently, Brazilian law states that teenage offenders are to be detained for a maximum
of just three years at “educational centers” in order to be “re-socialized,” but those in
favor of the proposal express an interest in seeing all criminals who commit heinous
crimes to pay for their actions and take responsibility as the young adults they are.
However, there are critics of this proposal who think sticking teenagers in the same
prisons as hardened criminals will do more harm than good. In a country such as Brazil,
with so much overcrowding and denunciations of ill treatment within detention centers
and prisons, it is difficult to find a balance to this problem. Even though it makes sense
to lower the age of responsibility from 18 to 16, it will mean more overcrowding and the
likelihood that when the teens are released from prison, they will have even more
criminal knowledge and behavior problems than before.
Rio’s state government’s efforts to lessen crime in Rio de Janeiro is of particular
importance because it established Rio’s Pacifying Police Units and introduced the steps
that these units take to maintain peace and stabilize the favelas. However, slavery in
Brazil created a vast lower class and extreme inequalities, and corruption and abuse of
power by authority figures have cast Brazil’s government in a very negative light.
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Because of this, and given its crime-ridden reputation, this section strove to answer how
well Brazil’s police are doing to tackle these problems. The UPP program is said to be
based on community policing, where 24-hour police units maintain a physical presence
within the favelas. Authorities say that the program has reduced crime and trafficking as
well as provided protection within pacified favelas, but critics suggest that the
government only started this project for the purpose of clearing out favelas surrounding
touristy/wealthy areas for the World Cup and Summer Olympics. They add that certain
types of crime have actually increased due to police presence, such as missing persons,
stray bullet incidents, and street crime, and some say they felt safer when the drug
traffickers were in charge.
Lastly, collaboration between the community and police is something the Rio state
government is striving to do with the UPP program; but what has been seen from the
majority of law enforcement is a “zero tolerance” mindset when it comes to crime in the
favelas. Because of this mindset, there is a question of whether Rio’s pacification
initiative truly embraces the concept of “community policing.” Brazil’s past relationship
between law enforcement and poor communities has cast doubt in the minds of many that
the government can install community-oriented policing in poor regions of Rio.
The original purpose of this research was to study Brazil’s current pacification efforts
in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. By examining existing empirical studies, this study
focused on whether Rio’s security efforts would ultimately be successful in fulfilling the
goal of making peace in the favelas and reducing drug trafficking and violence. In
addition, while spending six months in Rio de Janeiro, I visited pacified favelas and
interviewed several high-ranking security officials about their agencies’ current and
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future plans for pacification. To review, I will outline the most important research
questions found in this thesis:
1.) What are the tactics that UPP and BOPE use to reduce drug trafficking & stabilize
favelas?
2.) How successful have they been?
3.) What new/future tactics do they intend to use?
4.) Based on existing empirical studies, what is the likelihood that these new tactics
will be successful?

The interviewees’ responses to Question 1 suggest that they institute a form of
community policing as part of their “tactics” to reduce drug trafficking and stabilize
favelas. One interviewee answered that before UPP units are installed, the B.O.P.E.
squad will provide tactical intervention, and then UPP brings police occupation,
installation, evaluation, and monitoring. However, it is my opinion that their usage of
“community policing” is a bit far-fetched. It is clear from an outsider’s perspective that
the favelas are policed with a much heavier enforcement than would constitute
community-oriented policing as defined in the United States. Though, with more time
and training, the police officers serving in the UPP program can provide a truer form of
community policing than what is currently used. Although this is the case, Rio’s state
government and security personnel are on the right path to better protection and inclusion
of favela residents.
The question of their success is somewhat difficult to answer. The UPP program
had promise from the start, with statistics from certain media and government
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publications suggesting high levels of improvement, yet data from other sources suggest
that levels of certain crime have actually increased. One interviewee responded to this
question by giving numbers that show improvement, such as a reduction in cases of
intentional homicide in the state and a reduction in violent actions against life within the
last five years. It is true that homicide rates have lowered in the state of Rio de Janeiro
recently, but in other areas of Brazil violent crime has shot up, possibly due to drug
traffickers moving to other areas outside of Rio and becoming involved in turf wars with
other gangs. So when answering the question of UPP’s success, you have to take into
account the consequence of pushing drug dealers into other areas and whether the
government’s only concern is “cleaning up” the immediate surroundings of Rio’s wealthy
neighborhoods. If this is the case, I would rate the success of the program as low,
especially if there is no plan to make all of Rio safe from crime and instability.
Regarding the question on any new or future tactics they intend to use, from what
I gathered, Rio de Janeiro’s police forces do not have any new strategies in place for the
future, at least not publicly. The Pacifying Police Units’ current implementation of
“tactical intervention, police occupation, installation, evaluation, and monitoring” will
remain the same in the future, with the addition of better technology, human resources,
and training. More training is a definite must if police are to get out of the military-like
mindset that has taken hold since Brazil’s dictatorship. Although their new strategies are
not completely counterproductive, negative views of the program have not decreased,
which means there is something else needed to counteract the hostility and bitterness
favela residents have toward law enforcement.
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Lastly, based on existing empirical studies, it appears that UPP’s tactics have the
potential to succeed if implemented correctly. If authorities are going to claim
community policing as the UPP’s inspiration, then more work is needed to make that
concept true. Matching violence with violence has already proven to be unsuccessful, so
police have to acknowledge that a path of heavy enforcement and little community
outreach does not bode well for future success. Such instances are not strictly confined to
developing countries, though. If one examines cases of extreme unrest and outrage
among community residents and law enforcement in the United States, such as the case in
Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 where an officer shot and killed an unarmed black teen, you
might start to ask how events began spiraling out of control in the first place? On further
inspection, there appears to be a pre-existing pattern of mistrust between police officers
and residents when there is a virtually all-white police force within a majority AfricanAmerican city.
In many instances where these situations happen, it’s revealed that there was an
almost non-existent connection between the city’s police and its residents; no established
lines of communication. Instead of instilling community-oriented tactics, Ferguson
police opted for heavy-handed police tactics both before and after the shooting, including
a military-style response to the initial protests. Community policing could have reduced
tensions and violent reactions, but as is often the case in places like Ferguson and Rio,
officers and residents alike hold on to an “us versus them” mentality. When police
officers are not seen as part of the community, it is likely that unrest and violence will
soon follow. Questions one must ask are: How can you tackle violence in cities where
the police are untrustworthy? Where do you start when violence is deeply entrenched, as
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in Brazil and much of South America, where the world’s most dangerous cities are
housed?
Poverty and inequality levels are high in Brazil, particularly where black, mixed
race, and indigenous populations are disproportionately affected. These disparities
contribute to Brazil's high crime rate, particularly sparking violent crime in cities flanked
by favelas. Levels of violence in this region are further shown by a new study on global
peace released in June, 2015. Latin America emerged as a “less peaceful region” than it
was the year before, and according to the Homicide Monitor data project- an online tool
collating country-by-country statistics on homicides from a range of sources-, “one-infive murder victims around the world is Brazilian, Colombian or Venezuelan, despite the
three countries containing less than four per cent of the world's total population”
(Marszal, 2015).

Recommendations and Concluding Remarks
While this thesis tries to establish a strong sense of Brazil’s security system and
future success, it becomes clear that this country’s history and current policies are
complex topics to understand. In a region of the world where homicide rates are higher
than fatality rates in some of the world’s worst war zones, it can be hard to process the
many security challenges that arise. Yet Rio’s efforts in pacifying its state’s favelas show
promise that policy makers are serious in their quest for peace and stability.
However, though their hearts seem to be in the right place, their current tactics for
pacifying the favelas may be viewed as overly harsh. It’s understandable that with their
past history of violence the police would want to establish a permanent presence within
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the area, but for this to work long-term it is necessary to instill better community-oriented
policing rather than a “zero tolerance” mindset. While community policing may work in
the United States and elsewhere, there is a possibility that it may not work in Brazil;
perhaps some adaptation taking into account Brazil’s culture would work best. Already
the UPP Program seems to have lowered homicides in the areas of pacification, but petty
crime has risen and residents continue to die from stray bullets.
In addition to security efforts, other factors are needed to establish peace in the
favelas. Among the most important are economic improvement, financial improvement,
individual rights, and education. Social outreach programs are needed within the favelas
to balance law enforcement efforts, particularly ones targeting at-risk youth in unstable
environments. Also, implementing police strategies such as community policing,
intelligence-led policing, and inclusion could result in better police-citizen relationship.
Transparency and community involvement are obviously key instruments in building
trust with residents, but it is also necessary to train security personnel to use their power
properly, enforce accountability, and continually refine their policies. Finally, besides
the UPP Program, Rio’s government leaders should further incorporate favela residents
into society and advocate for better human rights as well as better laws regarding the
responsibility of public security.

.
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